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There is growing research that explores using an array of non-monetary incentives 
(NMIs) to attract and retain quality Sailors.  Non-monetary incentives used in this paper 
are: homeport choice, billet choice, platform choice and geographic stability.  This 
research experiments with the cost of non-monetary incentives for potential reenlistment 
by using a linear programming assignment optimization model.  The ICONIC 
(Identifying the Cost of Non-monetary Incentives) model was developed as a proof-of-
concept mechanism to identify the cost for non-monetary incentives.  
Forty-five Sailors and sixty billets was the sample size used to test the assignment 
model.  Forty-one different scenarios were run with 50 percent weight on both Navy 
preferences and Sailor preferences that included a variety of NMI offerings.  The same 
forty-one scenarios were run with 100 percent weight on Navy preference and 0 percent 
weight on Sailor preferences, and vice versa, for a total of one-hundred twenty-three 
different scenarios.  The number of NMIs offered in each scenario was incremented as 
follows:  five, ten, fifteen, twenty-five, and thirty-five.  PCS, training, and fit costs were 
used to calculate the cost of the NMIs.   
In general, the more emphasis placed on the Navy’s cost, Sailor value decreased.  
Conversely, Sailor value goes up when cost is ignored.  Moreover, the Sailor fit of a 
particular billet increases when cost is ignored.  The key component of the objective 
function was to minimize the Navy’s cost and increase value to the Sailor.  In general, the 
model’s results proved successful and showed a logical connection between the 
philosophical idea of how cost might behave as the number of NMIs offered increases 
and the heuristic assignment methodology.   
This proof-of-concept will continue to revolutionize the most economical way to 
attract and retain Sailors.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) needs flexible forms of compensation for its 
enlisted Sailors.  One of the starting points is to determine if the current compensation 
policy is effective in retaining enlisted Sailors.  A Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
study suggested that “changes in both Navy technology and civilian labor markets are 
going to require profound changes in the way the Navy recruits, trains, and compensates 
enlisted personnel.”1  While monetary compensation plays a role in Sailor retention, non-
monetary incentives could prove to be attractive to reduce attrition rates.   
In any public or private institution, compensation packages are designed to 
advance and achieve the organization’s goals.  The strength of a compensation package is 
measured by its ability to attract and retain a workforce with mission-critical skill sets.  
Moreover, a solid combination of incentives will evenly distribute the work, motivate the 
workforce, and maintain pay equity.  Of course, to do this at the lowest possible cost is 
challenging.  Attracting and retaining employees in mission-critical areas can be difficult, 
but the Navy recognizes the importance to pay-out additional money for lower blue-collar 
positions (e.g., network administrators and electronic technicians). 
The alignment of employees’ natural self-interests with the organization’s 
objectives is motivated by other means of encouragement.  A well-structured incentive 
system will motivate employees to achieve and exceed performance targets and lower 




                                                 
1 Martha E. Koopman, Steve Cylke, Heidi W. Golding, Michael L. Hansen, Thomas Husted. 
Compensation Strategy for the Future Force. Center for Naval Analyses, September 2000.  
 2
point, money is not the only thing that people value. “As a matter of fact, non-monetary 
rewards often are greatly valued by employees and, in some cases, they place a smaller 
financial burden on the firm.”2  
The Navy has historically had trouble meeting its retention targets and the 
programs to retain the current manning level are not effective.  The Navy is facing macro 
pressures to both become a more efficient organization and retain qualified Sailors to 
sustain readiness and accomplish its operational missions.  The current system relies on 
re-enlistment and retention bonuses to meet its end-strength targets.  In 2004, the Navy 
studied the number of selected reserve personnel needed to support the active force in 
meeting current and future mission requirements.  The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) recommended that the Navy establish guidance for ongoing and future 
workforce reviews to ensure resources are allocated cost effectively and provide the best 
mix of reserve and active duty personnel.3 
The Navy also faces future technological advances and budget constraints that 
combine to produce a new platform with reduced manning levels.  This could reduce 
maintenance, move workload from sea duty to shore rotations due to new information 
technology, and increase the use of trainers and more commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
technology.  Ultimately, the Navy needs to provide a range of distribution incentives to 
better meet the goal of allocating people across billets.  The Navy needs more flexibility 
in its compensation system as it moves forward in a dynamic economy and needs to 
adjust appropriately to changing conditions.  
There is growing research that explores using an array of non-monetary incentives 
(NMIs) to attract and retain quality Sailors.  Non-monetary compensation might include: 
homeport choice, billet choice, platform choice and geographic stability.  This research 
                                                 
2 Kenneth A. Merchant, Wim A. Van Der Stede. Management Control Systems. London: Pearson 
Prentice Hall, Second Ed., 2007. 
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. “Force Structure: Assessments of Navy 
Reserve Manpower Requirements Need to Consider the Most Cost-effective Mix of Active and Reserve 
Manpower to Meet Mission Needs,” October 2005, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06125.pdf . (Accessed: 
September 28, 2008). 
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estimates the cost of non-monetary incentives for potential reenlistment incentives by 
using a linear programming assignment optimization model. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to estimate the costs attached to offering non-
monetary benefits to enlisted Sailors.  Capturing the actual cost of non-monetary 
compensation would support a more robust cost-effectiveness analysis for the Navy.  
Specifically, the use of a linear programming assignment optimization model might help 
determine the cost impacts of proposed non-monetary reenlistment incentives, and those 
imposing constraints on the assignment process in particular.  Current simulation models 
analyzing non-monetary incentives assume a somewhat arbitrary fixed linear cost. This 
proof-of-concept project attempts to estimate those costs thorough an optimization model 
called “ICONIC” (Identifying the Costs of Non-monetary Incentives) and determine if 
there are non-linear trends as usage increases. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the cost of those non-monetary incentives that restrict Sailor assignments 
in the Navy’s Sailor detailing process? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What priorities guide detailer decisions in the assignment process? 
b. Will the optimization model provide a method to find the cost of non-
monetary incentives? 
c. How effective is the model as additional NMI constraints are imposed on 
the detailer’s decisions? 
d. How does this model compare/contrast to other similar assignment 
models? 
 4
D. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
This study focused on identifying the cost of non-monetary incentives for U.S. 
Navy Sailor reenlistments; specifically platform choice, billet choice, geographic 
stability, and homeport choice.  The findings, however, may serve as a springboard for 
identifying the costs of other NMIs and for other DoD Components. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II describes different modeling decisions and their outcomes using Linear 
Programming. This section also looks at the scope and methodology behind using an 
optimization model, provides a brief background of the Department of Navy community 
that was investigated, and describes the motivation behind this paper.  Last, this chapter 
will summarize comparative methodologies similar to this study. 
Chapter III presents the model’s data and data collected from the Navy Air Traffic 
Controllers (ACs) and Fire Controlman (FCs) survey.4  This chapter also introduces the 
associated data that helped identify the cost of NMIs.  
Chapter IV shows the model’s specifications and an overall view of how the 
model was designed in Microsoft Excel.  Also, this chapter reveals the cost of offering 
stand-alone NMIs versus offering multiple NMIs, and looks at trends from the model’s 
output.  
Chapter V draws final conclusions from the information presented, and 
recommends topics for future research.  
                                                 
4 Brooke Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM),” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008. 
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II. MODELING DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES 
A. MOTIVATION 
This research project is motivated by the recruitment and retention issues facing 
U.S. Navy personnel managers as they compete in an increasingly difficult labor market.  
This study is a component of a broader stream of research to develop a retention 
mechanism that optimally combines monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMIs).  A 
linear programming assignment model, called Identifying the Cost of Non-monetary 
Incentives (ICONIC), will be used to identify the actual cost of non-monetary incentives.  
The ICONIC model will find a heuristic answer that approximates the optimal solution 
and most cost-effective means of putting a Sailor in the right place based on their 
preferences.  The model examines the effects of imposing restrictions on those 
assignments to reflect NMIs such as home porting and geographic stability.  Detailers 
have to make many decisions before a Sailor is relocated and this research will examine 
those decisions and attempt quantify the effects of these restrictions with a constrained 
optimization model.   
1. Retention Mechanisms 
This research is just one of many on-going elements of Drs. Pete Coughlan and 
William Gates’ investigation into the opportunity costs of retention decisions, cash 
bonuses, and NMIs for retaining Sailors.  The exploration of alternative retention 
mechanisms is potentially very powerful, and potentially easier to analyze by limiting 
attention to specific levels of effort.5  Some of the mechanisms that could be used to 
incentivize reenlistment can be very costly.    
                                                 
5 William R. Gates and Peter J. Coughlan. “Mechanism Design for Defense Management: A Research 
Agenda and Representative Illustration.” Presentation at the Monterey Bay Aquarium, Monterey Bay, 
California, November 20, 2008.  
 6
A 2004 Center for National Policy (CNP) poll of Surface Warfare Officer 
(SWOs) was used to gather their opinions on monetary incentives as retention tool; one 







Figure 1.   Monetary Incentives as a Retention Tool (From Peter Coughlan and Bill 
Gates. Mechanism Design for Defense Management, Nov. 20, 2008) 
NMIs could prove to be cost-effective if the value of the incentive is greater than the 
cost for a sufficient number of service members.  Figure 2 shows the cost versus the value of 
NMIs.  Offering an NMI can be particularly cost effective if it is only offered to those for 
whom value exceeds cost, and to none of those Sailors where cost exceeds value. 
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Using a reverse combinatorial auction might assist in retaining the required 
number of service members.  In a reverse auction, there are many sellers and just one 
buyer; the winner is the seller who bids the lowest price, or with multiple winners the 
sellers with the lowest bids.  In a second-price reverse auction, the winner actually pays 
the second lowest bid (first excluded bid with multiple winners).  With a second price 
reverse auction, the dominant bidding strategy is to bid one’s true minimum required 
price.  Thus, the idea behind a reverse auction is to drive down the price of the purchase 
to the lowest level that satisfies the buyers demand.  
If Sailors are offered the opportunity to choose a package of incentives in place of 
a cash bonus, will the Navy successfully retain those individuals for less cost?6  The 
methodology behind a reverse combinatorial auction is to offer a “list” of retention 
incentives.7  The concept behind the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM) is a package bid.  Service members will submit a bid for their minimum 
required monetary retention bonus and the amount by which they would reduce this 
monetary bonus if they receive different NMIs or combinations of NMIs.  The retainees 
(i.e., the “winners”) ultimately receive retention packages involving a cash bonus and 
non-monetary incentives.8  The Navy’s cost for the retention bonus is equalized across all 
retainees, and equal to the cost of the first excluded bid. 
The reverse auction mechanism was examined in a second thesis project by 
Lieutenant Brooke Zimmerman, who considered two specific Navy communities: the Air 
Traffic Controllers (ACs) and the Fire Controlman (FCs).  The drawback to these earlier 
analyses is that both studies estimated the cost of the non-monetary benefits from the 
distribution of sailor values and assumed NMI costs were constant.  This research will 
attempt to estimate a Navy cost for the non-monetary incentives, hence providing a more 
robust representation of the net benefits from offering a combination of monetary and 
non-monetary incentives.  
                                                 
6 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley. 
Combinatorial Auction Theory Appplied to Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Rentention Incentives. 
MBA Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Pete Coughlan and Bill Gates.  Mechanism Design for Defense Management.  November 20, 2008. 
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B. SCOPE AND METHODOLGY 
Inevitably, NMIs do have costs.  While NMIs will have tremendous advantages 
for the reenlisted Sailor, if the cost of the NMI is not identified, then cost-effectiveness 
will be hard to measure.  A mathematical representation of the (ICONIC) model was 
created using a linear programming (LP) assignment model in Microsoft Excel.  In 
solving this LP model, an appropriate objective function from the detailer’s perspective 
will be imperative to finding a realistic optimal solution(s). 
1. The AC and FC Community 
Before discussing the ICONIC model and its application, it is perhaps instructive 
to describe briefly the Navy community data used from Lieutenant Brooke Zimmerman’s 
study:  Air Traffic Controllers (ACs) and the Fire Controlman (FCs).   This may help 
readers identify with the assignment of these Sailors to particular billets and the potential 
role that non-monetary benefits will play for these and other Navy communities.  Navy 
Air Traffic Controllers (ACs) perform duties similar to civilian air traffic controllers.  
They are responsible for controlling and directing air traffic at airfields and on aircraft 
carriers.  Fire Controlman (FCs) operate weapon systems on-board surface combatant 
ships.  Typical duties for FCs include maintaining digital computer equipment, routinely 
inspecting, testing, aligning and repairing computers and associated data equipment, and 
running performance tests on Navy combat systems.   
C. LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
1. Definition and Applications 
“Linear programming (LP) helps with resource allocation decisions.”9 There are 
many different types of linear programming models (e.g., Network Flow and Product 
Mix). They all seek to maximize or minimize some functional relationship, which is 
commonly referred to as the objective function.  Some examples of Network Flow and 
                                                 
9 Nagraj Balakrishnan, Barry Render and Ralph M. Stair. Managerial Decision Modeling with 
Spreadsheets. 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 25–30. 
 9
Product Mix problems include food blending, inventory management, portfolio and 
finance management, resource allocation for human and machine resources and planning 
advertising campaigns.  Some of the most common objective functions are:  minimize 
cost, maximize output, profit, revenue, etc.   
Management decisions play an important role when trying to make the most 
effective use of resources.  In any resource allocation situation, managers are constantly 
seeking the most efficient, or optimal choice.  “The most widely used decision modeling 
technique to help managers in this decision process is called mathematical 
programming.”10  In fact, mathematical programming is a form of basic algebra where 
real world decisions are described mathematically in the form of a model.  Often times, 
when a management problem is defined there can be an infinite number of solutions.   
Any problem having numerical decision variables and an objective function to be 
maximized or minimized is called an optimization problem.  If there are constraints, the 
problem is called constrained optimization.  Linear programs are constrained 
optimization problems that have certain special characteristics: the objective function and 
the constraints must be linear functions.  One of the cautions about a linear programming 
model is that all model data is not known with certainty, which is often not the case.  
Sensitivity analyses can be performed to overcome the uncertain elements in the model.     
The development of a linear programming model can be described in different 
steps: (1) Formulation, (2) Solution, and (3) Interpretation.11  In the first step, the goal is 
to be sure that the set of mathematical equations adequately represent the specific 
management decision.  Solving the problem in Microsoft Excel is the proposed method to 
find a solution from the mathematical expressions for the objective and constraints.  It is 
important to understand that this discussion will refer to the LP solution as an optimal 
solution rather than the optimal solution because the ICONIC model may have more than 
one optimal solution (i.e., more than one solution that provides the same optimal value 
                                                 
10 Nagraj Balakrishnan, Barry Render and Ralph M. Stair.  Managerial Decision Modeling with 
Spreadsheets. (Pearson Prentice Hall, Second Ed. 2007), 25–30. 
11 Ibid. 
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for the objective function).  Assuming that that mathematical expression is correct and is 
successfully solved using Microsoft Excel, results will subsequently be interpreted.   
One linear programming problem with a special structure that is frequently used 
in the operations research literature is called the transportation problem.  A common 
problem of this nature seeks to minimize the shipping cost between the manufacturer 
warehouses and retailers. “The objective of the company is to ship units from the 
warehouse to the retailer such that (a) no more units leave a warehouse than there are in 
stock, (b) the demands of the retailers are satisfied, and (c) the total shipping cost is 
minimized.”12  This is important to understand because the assignment model is a special 
case of the transportation problem.  A way to describe the assignment problem is finding 
the shortest path algorithm; assigning one Sailor to one billet that best meets the objective 
function, i.e., satisfies the detailer’s objective and the Sailor’s needs.   
Regardless of the size and complexity, the goal of solving a LP model is to devise 
an algorithm that mathematically represents an objective function and optimize the 
objective given a number of constraints.  A seemingly fruitful approach to identifying the 
cost of non-monetary incentives is through an assignment model where certain NMIs can 
be represented as constraints in the assignment problem (e.g., homeport of choice, 
geographic stability, etc.).  
2. The Assignment Model 
“The assignment method, also known as Flood’s technique or the Hungarian 
method of assignment, provides a much more efficient method of solving assignment 
problems.”13  The assignment method is also known as the weighted bipartite matching 
problem.14  One way to think about the assignment model is with the concept of 
economic opportunity loss: that is, the value of the next best alternative sacrificed as the 
                                                 
12 Horst A. Eislet, Giorgio Pederoli and Carl-Louis Sandblom. Continuous Optimization Models. 
Operations Research: Theory, Techniques, Applications. Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1987.  
13 Richard I. Levin, Charles A. Kirkpatrick and David S. Rubin. Quantative Approaches to 
Management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982. 
14 G.L. Nemhauser, A.H.G.Rinnooy Kan and M.J. Todd.  Optimization.  Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Pub. Co., 1989. 
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result of making a decision.  The best possible outcome in assigning one Sailor to one 
billet would involve an opportunity cost of zero.  This research will seek to identify 
optimal assignments, and analyze the properties of the optimal outcome as constraints 
representing NMIs are increased.  
The assignment model is a special case of linear programming that is the best way 
to assign ‘n’ persons to ‘m’ jobs, assuming that the “desirability” of assigning Sailor ‘i’ to 
job ‘j’ is dij. “Researches have suggested numerous algorithms for solving the assignment 
problem. Several of these algorithms apply, either implicitly or explicitly, the successive 
shortest path algorithm for the minimum cost flow problem.”15  
3. The ICONIC Application 
The ICONIC model should identify the most efficient mix of Sailors to billets and 
identify the cost of the NMIs. The challenges that this project might encounter include: 
identifying the appropriate objective function; including the most important assignment 
criteria from the detailer’s point of view; and the model’s effectiveness as constraints are 
added.  One possibility, at the conclusion of this study, will be to determine if this model 
could represent small- and large-scale Sailor populations.  
Conditions are constantly changing in real world situations; sensitivity analysis 
involves examining the optimal solution under changes in the values of input parameters.  
D. COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGIES 
Linear programming models can be problematic because real-world conditions 
are not always easy to formulate.  Multiplicity, richness, and vagueness exist in the real 
world, and it can be difficult to replicate these relationships mathematically.  In this 
research, the attempt to place a quantitative value (cost) on a non-monetary incentive has 
not yet been tested.  Moreover, it is easier to quantify objectives such as “maximize 
profit” or “minimize cost,” but more dubious objectives, such as the one proposed here 
                                                 
15 G.L. Nemhauser, A.H.G.Rinnooy Kan and M.J. Todd.  Optimization.  Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Pub. Co., 1989. 
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(mathematically representing the detailers’ objective functions to identify the cost of non-
monetary values), if not well-represented, can be misleading.    
Other questionable objectives, such as “achieve competitive superiority” or 
“provide the best service to the community” have been modeled before, but for these 
objectives, “surrogate criteria” have to be determined that substitute for the objective 
while still being closely related to the goal.16   
Linear programming models could have secondary implications as well.  For 
example, maximizing profits in the short run may suggest increasing prices for some 
goods, but there could be long term effects to the business:  increase in manpower, 
additional equipment purchases, shrinking market shares, slow growth, etc.17  
Maximizing long run profits might require a completely different market strategy.  In the 
public sector, (e.g., Department of the Navy) identifying the cost of non-monetary 
benefits will be handled by setting the objective function to reflect the detailers’ mindsets 
and decisions.    
1. Tangential Topics/Examples 
Most of the real-world assignment problems specifically answer a business 
question; for example planning transportation or distribution networks, and usually 
involve real cost data and product quantities that seek to minimize or maximize an easily-
quantifiable objective function.  The impediments in this research were trying to model a 
topic that is tangential in nature to real-world problem being modeled.  It is like trying to 
predict a company’s stock price, based on qualitative characteristics like cash flow, the 
company’s bond rating, or the significance of meeting analysts’ quarterly expectations.  
Research revealed problems that used a number of weights to define or determine the 
outcome of a subjective multi-attribute objective function (this is also known as Multi-
Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA)). In one example, a real-estate firm used weights on 
the characteristics of a certain property to secure a business transaction. 
                                                 
16 Horst A. Eislet, Giorgio Pederoli and Carl-Louis Sandblom. Continuous Optimization Models. 
Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1987.  
17 Ibid.  
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In one sense, this is a ground breaking endeavor.  Understanding the importance 
of other types of models and examples might provide insight into the author’s attempt to 
explore the cost of non-monetary incentives.  Below are a few examples of tangential 
topics. 
a. Inspection Optimization Model  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed a linear 
programming model designed for a state air-pollution control inspections program called 
an “Inspection Optimization Model” (IOM).  It was a joint project between the Stationary 
Source Compliance Division and Statistical Policy Branch of the EPA.  The EPA had 
divided air pollution sources into two main categories: mobile sources and stationary 
sources.  With too few inspectors and too many sources to inspect, the EPA had a 
difficult time responding to the worst violators, but would frequently send investigators 
to the areas of less concern; the process was very inefficient.  Thus, the EPA designed a 
quantitative approach that efficiently allocated inspectors to categories of stationary 
sources of air pollution within the given budgetary and policy constraints so that the most 
damaging violators are identified. 18 
The model’s primary goal was to provide a planning tool for distributing 
resources.  The major conceptual assumption of the model was that air quality will 
improve as a result of compliance with EPA guidelines.  Moreover, the IOM would 
improve the effectiveness of the inspection program and more violators would be 
identified, thereby increasing compliance. 
b. Heuristic Network-Flow Model 
The timeshare vacation industry is a significant player in travel 
accommodations for people who want to vacation in a nice home-away-from-home, 
rather than visiting the same resort year after year.  This opportunity is provided by 
timeshare exchanges that focus on the timeshare exchange fair.  The series of events 
                                                 
18 Jerzy A. Filar, Donna J. Nickerson and Phillip N. Ross. “Inspection Optimization Model.” Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences 28, issue 3 (1994): 137–146.   
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between owners and vacationers determines various aspects of how the exchange fair 
functions, and introduces a better optimized way of executing exchanges.19  In this case, 
a network flow model was developed as a platform for illustrating the tradeoffs between 
optimal solutions of the exchange fair and the multi-objective optimization involving 
which vacationer gets “what” and “when.”  “The timeshare exchange problem is an 
assignment problem where the available intervals (unit-resort-weeks) are assigned to 
intervals requested in order to maximize weighted utility of the trader.”20    
c. Audit Staff Assignment Model  
In this case, audit personnel are assigned to audit reports within the 
limitations of an audit office to meet the economic objectives of this office.  Not only 
does a linear programming model maximize the audit office’s economic objective, but it 
will also provide useful information such as: (1) schedule training requirements, (2) 
which members should work additional hours, (3) from which clients additional work 
should be sought, (4) whether to add audit clients when the office is running at capacity, 
(5) how vulnerable the office is to loss due to error in assignments.21  The audit office 
seeks to maximize the mixture of monetary and non-monetary benefits, and the problem 
for staff assignment is to identify and quantify that mixture.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Many of the problems that the Navy faces with low retention and Sailor 
dissatisfaction, in part, is caused by a distribution system that has inadequate incentives 
to balance the Navy’s needs with the Sailor’s preferences.22  Consequently, the Navy 
must rely on a combination of things: non-monetary incentives to entice volunteers to 
                                                 
19 Anton Ovchinnikov. “Timeshare Exchange Fair (A) and (B).” Darden School of Business, 
University of Virginia Publishing, Case UVA-QA-0709, (2007). https://store.darden.virginia.edu/business-
case-study/timeshare-exchange-fair-a-107 (Accessed November 2008). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Edward L. Summers. “The Audit Staff Assignment Problem: A Linear Programming Analysis.”  
The Accounting Review 47 (1972): 443-453. 
22 Martha E. Koopman, Steve Cylke, Heidi W. Golding, Michael L. Hansen, Thomas Husted. 
Compensation Strategy for the Future Force. Center for Naval Analyses, September 2000.  
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either move or remain in difficult-to-fill billets, frequent moves between good and bad 
assignments, and other special pays that can distort the environment and amenities that 
the next assignment offers.23   
The primary objective of this work is to produce reasonable estimates and/or 
characterizations of the costs associated with offering certain NMIs to enlisted Sailors. 
The variance in per unit costs, such as NMIs offered to smaller or larger percentage of a 
particular Sailor specialty, is one component to the model’s focus.  This research attempts 
to take the assignment model and explore the possibility of finding a quantitative solution 
to a heuristic modeling approach.  The objective function is to minimize the weighted 
average of the Navy’s cost minus the Sailors’ value, where the weights reflect the relative 
priorities detailers attach to Navy needs versus sailor preferences. 
Finding an optimum solution to this question can be complex and assigning costs 
to non-monetary incentives can be problematic.  The optimal solution to identifying the 
cost of non-monetary incentives is only as good as the model’s input and overall design.  
The next chapter will introduce the ICONIC model’s data and structure.       
                                                 
23 Martha E. Koopman, Steve Cylke, Heidi W. Golding, Michael L. Hansen, Thomas Husted. 
Compensation Strategy for the Future Force. Center for Naval Analyses, September 2000. 
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III. MODEL DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The general approach to collecting the required data for the assignment model had 
many components.  The ICONIC assignment matrix includes forty-five Sailors and sixty 
billets.  This data represents the normal distribution of assignments per detailer in an 
assignment window as found by LCDRs Richard Shlegel.24  The three Navy cost 
components factored into the model are:  Permanent Change of Station (PCS) or moving 
costs, training costs and pay grade mismatch costs (or fit costs).  Each cost component 
was assigned a value for each Sailor, based on the sailor’s and billet’s comparative 
characteristics (location, skills and pay grade).  The basis of the linear programming 
model was to create a utility function for each Sailor in each billet. The utility function 
was developed, in part, with the help of two Navy detailers that identified detailing and 
funding priorities.  
B. BILLET TYPE OF CHOICE 
Lieutenant Brooke Zimmerman’s survey of six-hundred and one enlisted Sailors 
showed that billet type of choice has more value than billet of choice.25  Billet type of 
choice involves skill requirements, or Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC), and is 
independent of Homeport or Platform of choice.  On the other hand, billet of choice 
includes Homeport and Platform type of choice; billet of choice is not used as one of the 
model’s constraints.  The ICONIC model characterizes billet type as NEC and randomly 
assigns choices based on probabilities of sailor preferences within the relevant population 
(E4-E6).  About 20 percent of sailors prefer the same NEC, whereas 80 percent prefer a 
                                                 
24 Richard J. Schlegel.  An Activity Based Costing Analysis of the Department of the Navy’s Enlisted 
Detailing Process.  Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000.  
25 Brooke Zimmerman.  Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008. 
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different NEC.26  During an interview, one detailer stated that billet type usually means 
NEC, however there are times it does not correspond to NEC.  Billet type; can refer to the 
pay grade of a billet (e.g., E4).  Random designation of billet type of choice affects cost 
estimates associated with this NMI, but does not affect cost estimates for other NMIs. 
C. PCS COSTS 
To calculate the average PCS costs, the author obtained the most recent table from 
the Joint Federal Travel Regulation (JFTR) to find the weight allowance (in pounds) 
broken down by Sailor rank.  Three moving companies were contacted (Allied, North 
American Van Lines and Mayflower) to gather estimated moving costs in two-thousand-
pound increments.  Each estimate was for a two- to three-bedroom living area.  Overseas 
(OCONUS) miles were not estimated.  A thirty-six month tour was used as the basic 
range that a Sailor would spend at one assignment.  For each year’s experience the 
enlisted Sailor has in his pay grade, a multiplier was used to calculate the total PCS cost 
to include the Sailor’s dependent status. PCS costs were generated between all regions in 
the model (San Diego, Seattle, Norfolk, and Jacksonville). Mileage between airports was 
used to estimate the total PCS move, based on dependent status and the associated weight 
allowance for E4s-E6s.   
PCS cost varies across assignments for each Sailor, and corresponds to the 
specific cost of moving each particular Sailor from his/her current billet to the assigned 
billet.  PCS costs increased with each NMI, because they will often require that the Sailor 
who is assigned to a billet must PCS from a more distant location than would be required 
if the NMI was not offered.   
D. TRAINING COSTS 
A training cost is incurred whenever a Sailor is assigned to an NEC which is not 
his/her current NEC.  Training costs include both school house costs, temporary lodging 
                                                 
26 Brooke Zimmerman.  Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008.  
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and per diem costs, and the sailor’s salary and benefits while in training,  Identifying 
potential training costs for a particular Sailor assignment is not easy.  There is no research 
that estimates a training cost associated with a specific assignment.  If a Sailor is assigned 
to a billet for which they do not have the requested NEC, the training cost required to 
ensure operational readiness at the next assignment is almost impossible to measure on a 
general basis.  To address this issue, and provide a training cost for the ICONIC model, 
the author sought out training costs.   Specific types of training were analyzed, along with 
dollar cost estimates for various pay grades.  The model assumed two weeks of training 
for each pay grade, but the model is designed so this can be varied as a fraction of a 
month.  Total training cost can increase with any of the NMIs modeled here if the number 
of Sailors assigned to new NECs increases when offering the NMI.   
E. FIT COST 
The Sailor and billet sample modeled here only includes pay grades E4 to E6.  For 
the purposes of this model, the linear program does not include E3s or E7s to E9s.   The 
rationale for including only E4s-E6s was two-fold: (1) to allow for “one-up, one-down” 
assignments and (2) to reflect actual detailing practice.  In one interview with the author, 
it was revealed that one-up, one-down type assignments are possible, sometimes at the 
Commanding Officer’s direction.27  For example, an E4 can be assigned to a billet 
designated for an E5 and vice versa.  It is also true that that a single detailer is only 
responsible assigning E4s, E5s, and E6s within a particular community.  In some cases, 
where the community has a larger number of enlisted Sailors, there might be two or three 
detailers within these pay grades to handle the sheer volume of assignments.  One-up and 
one-down assignments involve opportunity costs. 
An increase in pay grade mismatches could occur with each of the NMIs modeled 
here, because assignment restrictions to satisfy NMI constraints sometimes require that 
more Sailors be assigned to billets with a higher or lower designated pay grade than 
would be the case if the NMI was not offered.28  If an E5 is assigned to a billet 
                                                 
27 Jill Handley.  Interview with the author, January 2009. 
28 From: Pete Coughlan Research Notes.  August 20, 2009. 
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designated for an E4, the Navy is essentially paying too much in salary to fill that billet, 
which could be costly and a poor use of talent.  On the other hand, if the Navy assigns an 
E4 to a billet designated for an E5, the sailor may be under-qualified and the Navy bears 
an opportunity cost of value lost to the job.  Since the value of an E5 relative to an E4 is 
reflected in their salary differences, the cost of such mismatches corresponds to this 
salary difference.29  Thus, the cost to the Navy from assigning an E4 to an E5 billet (E5 
to an E4 billet) is equal in amount to the salary difference between an E5 and E4 for the 
length of the assignment.   The same is true for an E5 (E6) assigned to a billet designated 
for an E6 (E5).   
F. SAILOR PREFERENCES 
Random numbers were generated for each Sailor and each NMI (uniform between 
zero and one).  This determined their rank relative to the range of NMI values found in 
Lieutenant Brooke Zimmerman’s thesis work.  Sailors have a preferred Homeport, 
Platform type, and Billet type, but some Sailors feel more strongly about these 
preferences than others.  For example, while a majority of Sailors surveyed by LT 
Zimmerman assigned virtually zero value to choice of Platform type, 10 percent of the 
population valued this incentive at $10,000 or more.30  Thus, Sailor valuation of these 
NMIs varies significantly in the model (rather than simply assigning the same “value” to 
any Sailor who receives Geographic Stability or Billet choice). 
The model recognizes those Sailors who assign the highest value to an NMI 
should be the ones who receive the NMI.  In particular, the ICONIC model does not force 
any Sailor to receive an NMI.  Instead, if the assignment model, for example, provides 
Platform type to ten out of forty-five Sailors, then this NMI is given to the ten Sailors 
who have the highest valuation for platform type.  
                                                 
29 From: Pete Coughlan Research Notes.  August 20, 2009. 
30 Brooke Zimmerman.  Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008. 
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The ICONIC model captures the Sailor’s values in three distinct scenarios 
(discussed in Chapter IV).  The purpose of these scenarios was to illustrate the trend in 
cost versus Sailor valuation. 
G. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
Every element of the detailer’s objective function was specified in dollar terms.  
In particular, subject to the constraints (discussed in Chapter IV), the ICOINC model 
seeks to make the assignments which minimize: 
   Sailor N
Sailor 1
Navy Cost Sailor Utility  
 
where: 
Navy cost = PCS cost + training cost + fit cost (pay grade mismatch cost) 




V(NMI) = Average Sailor valuation for that NMI31  
 For homeport of choice, I(NMI) = 1 if Sailor was assigned to the homeport of 
his choice (whether or not this was given to him as an NMI) & I(NMI) = 0 
otherwise 
 For platform type of choice, I(NMI) = 1 if Sailor was assigned to the platform 
type of his choice (whether or not this was given to him as an NMI) & I(NMI) 
= 0 otherwise 
 For billet type of choice, I(NMI) = 1 if Sailor was assigned to the billet type of 
his choice (whether or not this was given to him as an NMI) & I(NMI) = 0 
otherwise 
 For geographic stability, I(NMI) = 1 if Sailor was assigned to his current 
homeport (whether or not this was given to him as an NMI) & I(NMI) = 0 
otherwise 
The ICONIC model uses average Sailor valuation for each NMI rather than each 
Sailor’s actual valuation for that particular NMI.  There is no “incentive compatible” or 
“truth revealing” way for a detailer to honestly know how much each Sailor values 
                                                 
31 Brooke Zimmerman. “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008. 
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Geographic Stability or his/her particular Homeport, Platform type, or Billet type of 
choice.32  It is probably not feasible for the detailer to infer the true NMI valuations by 
communicating with Sailors during the detailing process because Sailors will likely 
overstate their true value to have a better chance of receiving the NMI.  It is not 
unreasonable, however, for the detailer to have some idea how much Geographic 
Stability or Homeport, Platform type, or Billet type of choice is generally worth to the 
Sailor population the detailer is assigning.  Therefore, the model considers the average 
valuation for each NMI within the detailer’s community.  
 
 
                                                 
32 From: Pete Coughlan Research Notes.  August 20, 2009 
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IV. ICONIC MODEL AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basic idea behind the model’s design was to use the costs identified in 
Chapter III to calculate the cost for offering NMIs.  The objective function minimizes 
Navy cost minus the aggregate Sailor value.  The linear program was set-up as an 
assignment model and solved with Premium Solver, an add-in to Microsoft Excel (MS).  
The add-in is necessary because the standard MS solver could not solve an LP problem 
with the number of decision variables used in this research.  
The research recognizes the countless combinations that could be used to 
calculate the cost of NMIs.  The research focused on a robust set of combinations to see if 
the model works as intended (reference Appendix I).  Three distinct scenarios will be 
discussed in depth in this chapter.  The three scenarios will be referred to as 50% 
Navy/50% Sailor, 0% Navy/100% Sailor and 100% Navy/0% Sailor.  Each scenario 
placed the respective percentage weight on Navy costs and Sailor values in the selecting 
Sailor assignments.  For simplicity purposes, the author will use the abbreviations shown 
in Table 1 throughout the remainder of this paper.  
50% Navy/50% Sailor = 50/50 
0% Navy/100% Sailor = 0/100 
100% Navy/0% Sailor = 100/0 
Table 1: Abbreviations used for ICONIC’s assignments 
1. How It Works 
PCS costs were first collected for E4s-E6s (costs varied if the Sailor had 
dependents).  Assignments were grouped into four geographic regions in the continental 
United States (overseas assignments were not considered in this proof of concept model):  
continental US – east coast (CEC; e.g., Norfolk, VA); continental US – gulf coast (CGC; 
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e.g., Jacksonville, FL); continental US – north west (CNW; e.g., Bremerton, WA); and 
continental US – south west (CSW; e.g., San Diego, CA);  PCS costs were estimated, by 
region (i.e., CEC, CGC, CNW, and CSW) according to the location of the Sailor and the 
vacant position.  Training costs were estimated, based on a two-week training period if 
required to obtain a matching NEC.  Salary differentials were used to reflect the potential 
value lost/opportunity cost for one-up or one-down assignment. 
The second step was to create a forty-five by sixty matrix that indicates the 
Navy’s total cost by Sailor and billet, that aggregates PCS, training, and fit costs.  For 
example, in Figure 3, Sailor 4 (listed in the left-hand column) has a total cost of $6,928 if 
assigned to billet 7 (listed in the top row).    
Billets
Sailors Total Navy Cost 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2,560$           ‐$               2,560$          2,560$          2,560$          ‐$               ‐$                2,560$         
2 2,560$           2,560$          2,560$          2,560$          2,560$          2,560$          2,560$           2,560$         
3 2,560$           2,560$          ‐$               ‐$               2,560$          2,560$          2,560$           2,560$         
4 6,928$           6,928$          4,368$          4,368$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$           6,928$         
5 6,928$           6,928$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$           6,928$         
6 6,928$           6,928$          4,368$          4,368$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$           6,928$         
7 6,928$           6,928$          4,368$          4,368$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$           6,928$         
8 6,928$           6,928$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$          6,928$           6,928$         
9 10,428$         10,428$        7,868$          7,868$          10,428$        10,428$        10,428$         10,428$       
10 10,428$         7,868$          10,428$        10,428$        10,428$        7,868$          7,868$           10,428$       
11 9,686$           7,126$          9,686$          9,686$          9,686$          7,126$          7,126$           9,686$           
Figure 3.   Total Navy Cost 
The third step was to create an average Sailor value for Homeport, Platform, 
Billet, and Geographic Stability.  Random uniform variables between zero and one were 
generated for the forty-five Sailors and four NMIs.  This process allowed the author to 
approximate a dollar value for each Sailor for a particular NMI using Zimmerman’s value 
distribution.33  For assignment purposes, the detailer was modeled as knowing the 
average sailor value for each NMI as opposed to the sailor’s actual value.  NMI values 
help the detailer make an assignment based on the Sailors’ preferences.  For example, in 
Figure 4, the value for Sailor 4 (left-hand column) from billet 5 (top row) is $6,358. 
 
                                                 
33 Brooke Zimmerman.  Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Region CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC
NEC 7607 7612 7614 7614 7607 7612 7612 7607
Grade 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Paltform Other 2 CVN CVN CVN CVN Other 2 MCS LHA/LHD
Average
Homeport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 6,358$     6,358$      6,358$       6,358$       6,358$       6,358$       6,358$      6,358$    
2 ‐$         ‐$          ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$          ‐$        
3 ‐$         ‐$          ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$          ‐$        
4 6,358$     6,358$      6,358$       6,358$       6,358$       6,358$       6,358$      6,358$    
5 ‐$         ‐$          ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$          ‐$        
6 ‐$         ‐$          ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$          ‐$        
7 ‐$         ‐$          ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$           ‐$          ‐$          
Figure 4.   Homeport Opportunity Cost for Sailors 1–7 in Billets 1–8 
The fourth step was to determine which Sailors are eligible for which billets, 
based on awarded NMIs.  For example, if Sailor 2 is guaranteed homeport of choice and 
chooses an assignment in Jacksonville, FL (CGC) and billet 2 is not located in the Gulf 
Coast, then the binary variable in the feasible assignment table will be zero, precluding 
this assignment.  On the other hand, if the Sailor is guaranteed a billet in Norfolk, VA 
(CEC) and the billet is located in the East Coast, the then the binary variable in the 
feasible assignment table will be one, allowing this assignment.  Table 2 shows the binary 
decision for allowable and precluded assignments.  
1 = Allowable Assignment
0  = Precluded Assignment 
Table 2: Feasible Assignment Binary Decision Variables 
In Figure 5, for example, Sailor 3 is ineligible for billet 4 (do not fill); Sailor 9 can 
be assigned to billet 6 (fill).  
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Region CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC CEC
NEC 7607 7612 7614 7614 7607 7612 7612
Grade 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Paltform Other 2 CVN CVN CVN CVN Other 2 MCS  
Homeport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Figure 5.   Feasible Assignment Binary Variables for Homeport 
The fifth step was to incorporate the Navy’s “one-up, one-down” policy for 
assignments.  A one was given to feasible assignments based on pay grade (e.g., an E5 
assigned to an E6 position) and a zero if the match is not possible (e.g., an E4 assigned to 
an E6 position), reference Table 2. 
Last, Premium Solver (a MS Excel add-in) was used to sum the PCS, fit and 
training costs associated with each NMI as well as the Sailors’ values for each 
assignment.  ICONIC’s objective function was to minimize the Navy’s assignment costs 
minus the Sailors’ value.  Sailors that did not get an assignment were allotted a cost of 
one hundred thousand dollars; this enabled Solver to leave some sailors unassigned, but 
ensured Solver would make any feasible assignments, regardless of the Navy’s cost or the 
sailor’s value, before leaving a sailor unassigned.  Future research could examine the 
impact of reducing this unfilled assignment penalty, allowing the Navy to be more 
selective in deciding which sailors to assign and which to leave unassigned and shifted to 
the next detailing window.  
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2. Constraints 
There are three constraints for each binary forty-five by sixty assignment matrix.  
The constraints ensure that all Sailors are assigned to no more than one billet and that 
each billet was assigned no more than one sailor.  The assignment matrix depicts each 
sailor across a row and each billet down a column.  If a cell in the matrix has a value of 
one, the sailor in the corresponding row is assigned to the billet in the corresponding 
column; if the cell has a value of zero, the sailor is not assigned to that billet.  The final 
column in the assignment matrix represents the decision to leave the sailor unassigned in 
this detailing window.  The relevant constraints on the assignment matrix are as follows: 
 The sum of all the values for each Sailor (across a row) has to equal one 
(including the delayed assignment decision) 
 The sum of all the values for each billet (down a column) has to be less 
than or equal to one (not all billets are filled) 
 Sailors can only receive feasible assignments (assignments that satisfy 
one-up/one-down restrictions and satisfy any NMIs awarded) 
B. ESTIMATING THE COST OF STAND ALONE NMIS 
The model was first run with no NMIs.  This provides a baseline cost to compare 
the costs incurred when NMIs are offered to increasing numbers of service members.  As 
an illustration, Figure 6 shows the baseline average Navy cost per assigned Sailor with no 
NMIs, as well as the costs when five, ten, fifteen, twenty-five, and thirty-five service 
members are offered Homeport of choice, with a 50/50 weighting between Navy costs 
and service member preferences.  
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Figure 6.   Average Navy Assignment Cost Versus Homeport NMI (50/50 weights)  
There is an upward-sloping trend as the number of service members offered 
Homeport of choice increases. This makes sense, because the value to the Sailor is going 
up, but so is the cost to the Navy.  The baseline average billet costs are shown in Table 3.   
Table 3: Baseline Cost Offering No NMIs 
C. ESTIMATING THE COST OF MULTIPLE NMIS 
The same procedures were used as with offering stand-alone NMIs to analyze the 
effects of offering multiple NMIs.  As an illustration, Figure 7 shows an example of the 
average assignment costs with increasing numbers of Sailors offered Homeport and 
Platform, for 100/0 weights on Navy costs and Sailor preferences.  In this analysis, each 
NMI is offered to the Sailors who have the highest value for that NMI.  As a result, some 
Sailors may receive one NMI or the other, some may receive both, and others receive no 
NMIs.  
 50%/50% 100%/0% 0%/100% 
Baseline Cost $4,216 $3,110 $14,955 
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Figure 7.   NMIs Only Offered to Homeport and Platform–100% Navy/0% Sailor 
D. TRENDS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Before discussing the trends and observations from this model, it is important to 
emphasize that this research is largely a proof-of-concept.  The analysis examines several 
different scenarios (relative weights on Navy costs and Sailor preferences as well as 
different numbers and combinations of NMIS offered), but it only examines one sample 
of billets and sailors and one distribution of sailor NMI values.  As a result, the following 
discussion should be considered preliminary and simply illustrative of the results we can 
expect after running the model with different sailor and billet characterizations and 
different NMI value distributions.  Future research will incorporate Monte Carlo 
simulation into the LP model developed here, leading to a more robust set of results.  The 
intent here is to verify this proof-of-concept model and summarize the preliminary 
results. 
In general, across all the different combinations of NMIs offered (reference 
Appendix I, J, and K) the average billet costs for 0/100 are three times higher than the 
other two scenarios: 50/50 and 100/0.  Moreover, the NMI value for 0/100 is twice as 
high as the value for 100/0.  This makes sense; if the Navy has no regard for cost and puts 
all priority on Sailor preferences, one would expect the Sailors to have their preferred 
assignment choice regardless of cost, which would ultimately cost more and increase 
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Sailor value.  These Navy cost and Sailor value trends indicate that the ICONIC model is 
working intuitively. In summary, with more emphasis placed on cost, total NMI value 
and total average billet costs decrease. 
1. 50% Navy / 50% Sailor  
In this scenario, the average billet total costs for all combinations of NMIs is 
generally linear (constant marginal cost to offering an additional NMI) until fifteen or 
more NMIs are offered (33% of total sailors to be assigned); the slope of the curve starts 
to increase (increasing marginal cost) as the number of NMIs exceeds 15.  This 
increasing marginal cost generally reflects increasing fit costs (increasing one-up/one-
down assignments).  There is an increase in fit costs for all combinations of NMIs or 
stand-alone NMIs when fifteen or more NMIs are offered.  For NMIs that include 
Homeport, either alone or in combination, there an increase in PCS cost; without 
Homeport, the PCS cost is essentially linear.   Training costs remain essentially constant 
regardless of the number or combination of NMIs offered.  Except when Homeport is 
offered, assignment cost is flat for fewer than fifteen NMIs.  (See Appendix C) 
In general, average Sailor values for all NMIs, regardless of the number of NMIs 
offered, is relatively constant and between twelve thousand and thirteen thousand dollars 
(see Appendix D).  Homeport, either alone or in combination with other NMIs, is the 
only NMI that shows an increase in average sailor value after fifteen or more Sailors are 
offered the homeport NMI.   
2. 100% Navy / 0% Sailor 
When the Navy places all priority on Navy cost in making Sailor assignments, 
NMIs can potentially have a big impact on both Navy costs and Sailor Values.  Average 
total billet cost doubles after fifteen or more NMIs are offered, except for the stand alone 
Platform NMI, which shows a linear trend in cost (see Appendix E).  For example, PCS 
costs double from the baseline cost of two thousand three hundred seventeen dollars with 
no NMIs offered to five thousand two hundred fourteen dollars with thirty-five Sailors 
offered choice of Homeport only.  This pattern is true for any combinations of NMIs that 
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include Homeport.  This makes sense because the Navy is controlling cost and hence 
PCS costs; as more Sailors are offered the Homeport NMI, cost should increase rapidly.  
With the Navy placing all priority on minimizing costs, Sailor value increases at 
least slightly, primarily for the specific NMIs offered.  NMIs involving Billet and 
Homeport have the strongest increasing trend in total NMI value (see Appendix F).  This 
probably reflects the heavy constraints the model places on filling the least expensive 
assignment with the Navy placing 100 percent emphasis on cost. 
3. 0% Navy / 100% Sailor 
In this scenario, there is no emphasis on cost and the Navy gives all priority to 
Sailor preferences; average billet costs remain flat for all combinations of NMIs, except 
for those involving Geographic Stability (see Appendix G).  This result is expected and 
again tends to validate the ICONIC model.  If the Navy gives all priority to satisfying 
Sailor preferences, there is little impact on assignments if the Navy offers Sailors 
guaranteed NMIs.  The one exception is geographic stability, which shows slightly 
decreasing average total billet costs after five or more Sailors are offered this NMI.  The 
decrease in average total costs is driven by a decrease in average PCS costs; when 
Geographic Stability is offered, average PCS cost actually goes down because the sailors 
offered Geographic Stability are retained in their current location.  Fit costs actually 
increase after fifteen or more sailors are offered geographic stability because it becomes 
harder to match pay grades as fewer people able to move.  This is not true in any other 
scenario for 0/100.  Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the impact of Geographic Stability. 
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Figure 8.   Average Billet Costs–NMIs Offered to Billet and Geographic Stability 

















Figure 9.   Average Billet Costs–NMIs Offered to Geographic Stability 
Sailor value is also relatively constant in the 0/100 scenario; again, if the Navy 
places all priority on Sailor preferences when making assignments, guaranteed NMIs 
offer little value.  In fact, in some cases offering too many NMIs may preclude the ability 
to match Sailor preferences in other dimensions; total value may actually show a slightly 
decreasing trend (See Appendix H).  Additional model runs are needed to verify if these 
slight trends have any statistical significance. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
1. Research Questions and Answers 
Question: What is the cost of non-monetary incentives that impose 
restrictions on Sailor assignments in the Navy’s Sailor detailing process? 
Answer: The cost of NMIs varies depending on how much weight is 
placed on the Navy’s financial implications versus Sailor preferences.  In general, the 
stand alone NMI costs offering five NMIs are shown in Table 4.  
NMIs 50%/50% 100%/0% 0%/100% 
Homeport $5,097 $3,856 $14,918 
Platform $4,216 $3,110 $14,706 
Billet Choice $4,216 $3,193 $14,955 
Geographic Stability $4,227 $3,110 $14,902 
Table 4: Stand-alone NMI Cost: Five Sailors 
The difference in total cost (shown in Table 4) between offering five 
NMIs and zero NMIs represents the marginal cost.  Table 5 illustrates the model’s 






NMIs 50%/50% 100%/0% 0%/100% 
Homeport $881 $746 -$37 
Platform $0 $0 -$249 
Billet Choice $0 $83 $0 
Geographic Stability $11 $0 -$53 
Table 5: Marginal Cost 
Question: What priorities guide detailer decisions in the assignment 
process? 
Answer: Detailers are faced with a constrained budget and must live 
within these fiscal constraints.  PCS cost is the prominent component that erodes the 
detailer’s budget. 
Question: Will the optimization model provide a method to find the cost 
of non-monetary incentives?   
Answer: The proof-of-concept ICONIC assignment model appears to be 
working as expected.  The model is designed for a thirty-six month assignment, but does 
not depend critically on the duration that a Sailor will spend at each duty station.  When 
excess NMIs are offered, the model prevents solver from assigning Sailors.   
Question: How effective is the model as additional NMI constraints are 
imposed on the detailer’s decisions?   
Answer: Premium Solver did an excellent job of adapting to the 
constraints that the author put on the model as discussed in Chapter 4.A.2.  However, as 





Question: How does this model compare/contrast to other similar 
assignment models?   
Answer:  In some regards there are unknowns about how robust the 
assignment is compared to other studies.  The author’s research did find other 
investigations looking at similar issues. 
B. CONCLUSION 
As it stands, the proof-of-concept assignment model appears to working as 
expected.  In concept, if cost is no factor, Sailor valuation goes up and adding NMIs will 
have little effect.  If cost savings is emphasized, sailor value is lower and Sailor value 
goes up as additional NMIs are added..  The results of the model show these trends.  The 
mathematical formulation and objective function presented in this paper reflects many 
modifications and simplifications that were required to make a workable model.  
Consequently, it is important to emphasize that the goal of this research is simply to 
demonstrate a proof-of-concept model to analyze the cost of non-monetary incentives 
enlisted assignments in the U.S. Navy.   
As the present version of the model illustrates, identifying the cost of non-
monetary incentives will only be as good as the model’s inputs.  That is, if the model’s 
parameters are grossly inaccurate, or its constraints badly specified, then its output could 
have little meaning.  On the other hand, “bad” or counter-intuitive output can be used to 
detect inaccurate assumptions about the model’s parameters and/or constraints which, in 
turn, should help troubleshoot these elements.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Increased Scale of Research 
The model is designed in such a way that it could be used for more Sailors and 
additional billets.  There are limitations however, with the use of the Premium Solver 
add-in to Microsoft Excel.  This research primarily addressed one particular community.  
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Extended research would be beneficial for other enlisted communities like for squadrons 
or aviators, or even Fleet Concentration areas.   
There are many ways in which even the current model could be made more 
sophisticated and thereby improved.  The current results reflect the relative costs 
incorporated into this model, particularly the opportunity costs associated with the one-
up, one-down Navy assignment policy and the cost imposed on unfilled billets.  It is 
recommended that the same model be used with different costs for these policy-related 
variables to explore the impacts of alternative relative preferences. 
Similarly, there many more combinations in which NMIs could be offered in the 
basic model and different percent emphases on Navy costs versus Sailor preferences.  
These alternative specifications should be explored further.     
The use of Monte Carlo simulation would also make the model more robust and 
help explore alternative specifications.  Random sampling from probability distributions 
would make the model more “dynamic” in the sense that its parameters could be varied to 
determine the statistical significance of the model’s results.   
2. Increased Scope of Research  
As the ICONIC model becomes more robust, the results from this model can be 
integrated into retention mechanisms that combine monetary and non-monetary 
incentives.  Individualized incentive packages that reflect service member’s specific 
preferences and circumstances will greatly increase quality of life and reduce the Navy’s 
retention costs.  Understanding NMIs costs is an important step to exploiting these 
retention tools.  As this research progresses, it is important to incorporate this cost 
analysis into the Navy’s Sailor retention programs. 
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APPENDIX A:  DETAILER INTERVIEW 
I am conducting this interview in support of my MBA Project research for the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  My MBA project topic supports a proof-of-concept to 
identify the cost of non-monetary incentives.  My primary purpose is to identify the cost 
of non-monetary benefits with the use of a linear programming assignment optimization 
model.  Interview results are confidential and unclassified.  Results will be used for 
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APPENDIX B:  DETAILER QUESTIONNAIRE 
Section I   
  Detailer priorities when making assignments (sea/shore rotation, PCS 
costs, NEC utilization, Sailor career advancement (training), etc.) 
1. If a Sailor was put into a billet that was less qualified than a more desirable 
candidate, do you have an estimate of what the average cost would be to train 
the less qualified Sailor? 
2. What is the present average PCS cost per Sailor broken down by rank? 
3. Besides PCS Costs and training costs, are there other costs that are associated 
with moving/placing a Sailor into their next assignment? 
4. I am looking at developing an assignment model and exploring the impact of 
what PCS Costs and training costs (and other costs not mentioned) that would 
have on the Navy; more specifically, in your opinion do you think operational 
readiness would suffer as a result? 
5. What implications do you foresee if you had to place a Sailor into a position 
that was less qualified?  What costs would be attributable to that decision? 
6. One aspect in the assignment model will be the weights of certain 
characteristics.  For example, if it costs the Navy zero dollars to have a Sailor 
stay in a geographic location that would be a “5”, if it cost the Navy less than 
$500 (or some value), that would get a “4”, and so on.  Is there a range or a 
distribution of costs that you have for the different types of placement costs? 
7. Are there other OCONUS costs that are taken into consideration when a Sailor 
takes there next assignment? 
8. We think, initially, it would save the Navy money to offer geographic stability 
to Sailors.  But a certain number (of Sailors), the system would place too 
many constraints on the detailers.  At what number (of Sailors) do you 
anticipate it would become infeasible to offer geographic stability to a Sailor?  
(This would probably have to be broken down by rank, rate and NEC). 
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9. The assignment model must optimize readiness and stability for both afloat 
and ashore activities.  Secondly, the assignment system must provide equal 
opportunity for personnel to serve in their desired duty.  At what point in your 
decision making will the command’s preference make you change your mind?  
For example, on average the command billet’s preference is usually happy 
with their 4th choice and down i.e. 3rd, 2nd, 1st. 
10. Detailer decisions, primarily subjective, may not always result in the best 
match for the Navy and/or the Sailor.  Detailers must consider numerous, 
often changing, policies and procedures promulgated by the DoD, CNO, 
MCA, and CNPC when matching personnel to billets.  Also, detailers are 
sensitive to these preferences but must ultimately fulfill the Navy’s immediate 
job priorities.  Some commands been forced to receive less qualified Sailors to 
avoid vacancies in key positions, reducing mission effectiveness,   How do 
you weigh the command’s and Sailor’s preferences for a position? 
11. Sailors today expect fast answers and quick explanations for why they were 
not selected for the first-choice job or what their next career-enhancing move 
should be.  Do you think that this would slow down the decision making 
process if you had other incentives to offer and have to explain them? 
12. In this assignment model, at some point detailers might be forced to pay 
higher PCS costs based on the decision that were previously made/promised 
to other Sailors, is there a range of PCS costs that you are willing to accept? 
13. The same would be true for Training costs, at what point would you recall a 
promise made to one Sailor if the projected training cost was too high for the 
less desirable Sailor? 
Section II 
 How would non-monetary incentives affect your job (particularly geographic 
stability and homeport)? 
1.  Since you deal with a range of enlistees (i.e., different pay types), would it 
matter what non-monetary incentive (e.g., homeport, geographic stability) you 
would give a particular Sailor? 
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2. Which do you think would be easier to manage: Choice of homeport or 
geographic stability?  Could you manage both? 
3. How would the cost/feasibility differ by pay grade? (E–6s are more 
specialized and there are les of them then E–3s, for example). 
4. It seems as though some Sailors would rather separate from the Navy rather 
than accept undesirable orders, do you think would a non-monetary incentive 
like homeport is a great enough incentive to retain that Sailor? 
Section III 
 General opinion regarding the effectiveness in offering non-monetary 
incentives. 
1.  I am working on trying to identify the costs associated with non-monetary 
benefits, based on your experience, do you think offering a non-monetary 
incentive would be more attractive than money? 
2.  Ideally, I want to mathematically represent a detailer’s decision in an 
optimization model that assigns one Sailor to one billet.  Do you currently use 
any optimization or linear programming models that influence your decision 
making? 
3.  In general, are detailers are concerned about constituents’ satisfaction and take 
necessary steps to ensure repeated success? 
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APPENDIX C:  AVERAGE BILLET COSTS/ASSIGNED FOR 50% 
NAVY AND 50% SAILOR 
For illustration purposes, Appendices C, D, E, F, G, and H show ICONIC’s 
graphical results.  Appendices C, E, and F show average billet costs/assigned by PCS, 
Training and Fit costs for 50 percent Navy/50 percent Sailor, 100 percent Navy/0 percent 
Sailor, and 0 Navy/100 percent Sailor, respectively. 
Appendices D, F, and H show average Sailor values/assigned by Homeport, 
Platform, Billet and Geographic Stability for 50 percent Navy/50 percent Sailor, 100 
percent Navy/0 percent Sailor, and 0 percent Navy/100 percent Sailor respectively. 
The X axis shows the number of NMIs given ranging from five, ten, fifteen, 
twenty-five, and thirty-five Sailors.  The Y axis shows the average cost per assigned 
Sailor in dollars.   













































































































































APPENDIX D:  AVERAGE SAILOR VALUES/ASSIGNED FOR 50% 
NAVY AND 50% SAILOR 
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APPENDIX E:  AVERAGE BILLET COSTS/ASSIGNED FOR 100% 
NAVY AND 0% SAILOR 
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APPENDIX F:  AVERAGE SAILOR VALUES/ASSIGNED FOR 100% 
NAVY AND 0% SAILOR 
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APPENDIX G:  AVERAGE BILLET COSTS/ASSIGNED FOR 0% 
NAVY AND 100% SAILOR 
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APPENDIX H:  AVERAGE SAILOR VALUES/ASSIGNED FOR 0% 
NAVY AND 100% SAILOR 
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APPENDIX I:  DATA FOR AVERAGE BILLET COSTS AND 
AVERAGE SAILOR VALUES FOR 50% NAVY AND 50% SAILOR  
NMIs Offered PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Billet 5 $2,402 $1,814 $0 $4,216 5 $2,967 $1,766 $3,690 $3,398 $11,821
Billet 10 $2,577 $1,757 $0 $4,334 10 $2,967 $1,766 $3,809 $3,295 $11,837
Billet 15 $2,582 $1,757 $0 $4,339 15 $2,684 $1,709 $4,048 $3,295 $11,735
Billet 25 $2,811 $1,810 $247 $4,868 25 $2,684 $1,652 $4,286 $3,295 $11,916
Billet 35 $3,377 $1,981 $1,619 $6,977 35 $2,684 $1,424 $5,000 $3,192 $12,300
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Billet/Geo Stab 5 $2,520 $1,707 $0 $4,227 5 $2,826 $1,823 $3,571 $3,398 $11,617
Billet/Geo Stab 10 $2,958 $1,606 $0 $4,564 10 $2,543 $1,595 $3,809 $3,398 $11,345
Billet/Geo Stab 15 $2,939 $1,707 $384 $5,029 15 $2,684 $1,766 $3,809 $3,500 $11,760
Billet/Geo Stab 25 $2,477 $1,797 $1,935 $6,209 25 $2,746 $1,456 $4,505 $3,685 $12,392
Billet/Geo Stab 35 $2,511 $2,109 $4,304 $8,923 35 $3,101 $1,500 $4,704 $4,294 $13,599
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Geo Stab 5 $2,520 $1,707 $0 $4,227 5 $2,826 $1,823 $3,571 $3,398 $11,617
Geo Stab 10 $2,783 $1,606 $0 $4,390 10 $2,543 $1,595 $3,690 $3,500 $11,329
Geo Stab 15 $2,783 $1,606 $0 $4,390 15 $2,543 $1,595 $3,690 $3,500 $11,329
Geo Stab 25 $2,566 $1,656 $1,151 $5,374 25 $2,543 $1,709 $3,690 $3,912 $11,855
Geo Stab 35 $2,769 $1,742 $1,962 $6,474 35 $3,035 $1,689 $3,409 $4,212 $12,345
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP 0 $2,402 $1,814 $0 $4,216 0 $2,967 $1,766 $3,690 $3,398 $11,821
HP 5 $2,950 $1,763 $384 $5,097 5 $3,532 $1,595 $3,690 $3,192 $12,009
HP 10 $3,569 $1,874 $384 $5,826 10 $4,097 $1,538 $3,809 $2,780 $12,224
HP 15 $4,061 $1,864 $878 $6,802 15 $4,380 $1,652 $3,690 $2,368 $12,090
HP 25 $4,811 $1,975 $1,398 $8,184 25 $4,945 $1,652 $3,571 $2,265 $12,433
HP 35 $5,214 $1,968 $1,962 $9,145 35 $5,780 $1,631 $3,409 $2,211 $13,031
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP/Plat 5 $2,950 $1,763 $384 $5,097 5 $3,532 $1,595 $3,690 $3,192 $12,009
HP/Plat 10 $3,562 $1,810 $494 $5,866 10 $3,815 $1,709 $3,333 $2,780 $11,637
HP/Plat 15 $3,768 $1,961 $645 $6,374 15 $3,902 $1,748 $3,653 $2,527 $11,829
HP/Plat 25 $4,630 $1,961 $1,543 $8,133 25 $4,624 $2,097 $3,044 $2,317 $12,081
HP/Plat 35 $4,871 $2,146 $1,456 $8,472 35 $5,217 $2,103 $3,022 $2,613 $12,955
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP/Plat/Billet 5 $2,950 $1,763 $384 $5,097 5 $3,532 $1,595 $3,690 $3,192 $12,009
HP/Plat/Billet 10 $3,405 $1,810 $878 $6,093 10 $3,532 $1,652 $3,809 $2,780 $11,773
HP/Plat/Billet 15 $3,740 $1,903 $1,150 $6,793 15 $3,613 $1,689 $4,018 $2,527 $11,847
HP/Plat/Billet 25 $4,687 $1,950 $2,756 $9,393 25 $4,436 $2,027 $3,737 $2,370 $12,570
HP/Plat/Billet 35 $5,226 $2,190 $3,209 $10,625 35 $5,268 $2,050 $4,286 $2,383 $13,987
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Plat 5 $2,402 $1,814 $0 $4,216 5 $2,967 $1,766 $3,690 $3,398 $11,821
Plat 10 $2,402 $1,814 $0 $4,216 10 $2,967 $1,766 $3,452 $3,398 $11,583
Plat 15 $2,576 $1,814 $0 $4,389 15 $3,108 $1,766 $3,452 $3,398 $11,724
Plat 25 $2,509 $1,910 $631 $5,050 25 $3,108 $1,936 $3,333 $3,500 $11,879
Plat 35 $2,617 $1,917 $631 $5,165 35 $2,826 $2,221 $3,095 $3,295 $11,437
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Plat/Geo Stab 5 $2,520 $1,707 $0 $4,227 5 $2,826 $1,823 $3,571 $3,398 $11,617
Plat/Geo Stab 10 $2,764 $1,757 $384 $4,904 10 $2,684 $1,766 $3,333 $3,603 $11,387
Plat/Geo Stab 15 $2,550 $1,738 $392 $4,681 15 $2,746 $1,806 $3,409 $3,580 $11,540
Plat/Geo Stab 25 $2,315 $1,786 $1,823 $5,924 25 $2,746 $1,981 $3,044 $3,896 $11,666
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APPENDIX J:  DATA FOR AVERAGE BILLET COSTS AND 
AVERAGE SAILOR VALUES FOR 100% NAVY AND 0% SAILOR 
NMIs Offered PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Billet 5 $2,289 $904 $0 $3,193 5 $1,837 $1,253 $2,143 $3,398 $8,630
Billet 10 $2,464 $1,004 $0 $3,468 10 $1,837 $1,139 $2,381 $3,295 $8,651
Billet 15 $2,464 $1,218 $0 $3,682 15 $1,837 $1,253 $3,095 $3,295 $9,480
Billet 25 $2,667 $1,389 $247 $4,302 25 $1,978 $1,367 $3,809 $3,089 $10,243
Billet 35 $2,987 $1,824 $1,619 $6,430 35 $1,978 $1,253 $4,524 $3,089 $10,843
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Billet/Geo Stab 5 $2,289 $904 $0 $3,193 5 $1,837 $1,253 $2,143 $3,398 $8,630
Billet/Geo Stab 10 $2,742 $1,061 $0 $3,802 10 $1,978 $1,196 $2,143 $3,398 $8,714
Billet/Geo Stab 15 $2,703 $1,225 $384 $4,312 15 $1,978 $1,139 $2,857 $3,500 $9,475
Billet/Geo Stab 25 $2,464 $1,410 $1,935 $5,809 25 $2,601 $1,165 $3,653 $3,685 $11,104
Billet/Geo Stab 35 $2,511 $1,991 $4,304 $8,806 35 $2,791 $1,125 $4,442 $4,294 $12,653
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Geo Stab 5 $2,317 $793 $0 $3,110 5 $1,695 $1,367 $1,786 $3,295 $8,143
Geo Stab 10 $2,595 $850 $0 $3,445 10 $1,837 $1,367 $1,548 $3,398 $8,149
Geo Stab 15 $2,595 $850 $0 $3,445 15 $1,837 $1,367 $1,548 $3,398 $8,149
Geo Stab 25 $2,505 $800 $1,151 $4,456 25 $2,119 $1,139 $1,429 $3,603 $8,290
Geo Stab 35 $2,691 $924 $1,962 $5,578 35 $2,746 $1,340 $1,096 $4,107 $9,288
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP 0 $2,317 $793 $0 $3,110 0 $1,695 $1,367 $1,786 $3,295 $8,143
HP 5 $2,817 $793 $247 $3,856 5 $2,402 $1,424 $1,190 $3,089 $8,105
HP 10 $3,359 $893 $247 $4,499 10 $2,967 $1,253 $1,190 $2,574 $7,984
HP 15 $3,915 $793 $741 $5,449 15 $3,250 $1,253 $1,071 $2,162 $7,736
HP 25 $4,717 $739 $1,398 $6,855 25 $4,663 $1,253 $595 $2,265 $8,776
HP 35 $5,214 $862 $1,962 $8,039 35 $5,780 $1,049 $609 $2,211 $9,648
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP/Plat 5 $2,817 $793 $247 $3,856 5 $2,402 $1,424 $952 $3,089 $7,867
HP/Plat 10 $3,331 $893 $494 $4,718 10 $2,684 $1,481 $1,071 $2,574 $7,811
HP/Plat 15 $3,613 $920 $645 $5,178 15 $3,324 $1,573 $1,096 $2,422 $8,414
HP/Plat 25 $4,630 $917 $1,543 $7,090 25 $4,624 $1,864 $974 $2,317 $9,779
HP/Plat 35 $4,871 $1,273 $1,456 $7,600 35 $5,217 $2,037 $687 $2,613 $10,554
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP/Plat/Billet 5 $2,732 $1,004 $384 $4,119 5 $2,402 $1,424 $2,024 $3,192 $9,041
HP/Plat/Billet 10 $3,426 $1,154 $631 $5,211 10 $2,684 $1,538 $1,905 $2,574 $8,701
HP/Plat/Billet 15 $3,763 $1,249 $898 $5,910 15 $3,179 $1,515 $2,679 $2,317 $9,689
HP/Plat/Billet 25 $4,687 $1,789 $2,756 $9,231 25 $4,436 $1,907 $3,239 $2,370 $11,953
HP/Plat/Billet 35 $5,262 $2,190 $2,892 $10,343 35 $5,086 $1,977 $4,286 $2,250 $13,599
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Plat 5 $2,317 $793 $0 $3,110 5 $1,695 $1,424 $1,548 $3,295 $7,962
Plat 10 $2,324 $843 $0 $3,167 10 $1,837 $1,709 $1,429 $3,192 $8,166
Plat 15 $2,324 $843 $0 $3,167 15 $1,837 $1,709 $1,429 $3,192 $8,166
Plat 25 $2,359 $843 $247 $3,449 25 $1,837 $1,880 $952 $3,089 $7,757
Plat 35 $2,704 $1,007 $247 $3,958 35 $1,978 $2,221 $833 $2,780 $7,812
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Plat/Geo Stab 5 $2,317 $793 $0 $3,110 5 $1,695 $1,424 $1,548 $3,295 $7,962
Plat/Geo Stab 10 $2,535 $907 $384 $3,826 10 $2,119 $1,538 $1,190 $3,500 $8,348
Plat/Geo Stab 15 $2,316 $869 $392 $3,578 15 $2,168 $1,631 $1,218 $3,475 $8,491
Plat/Geo Stab 25 $2,285 $920 $1,823 $5,028 25 $2,168 $1,922 $1,339 $3,580 $9,009
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APPENDIX K:  DATA FOR AVERAGE BILLET COSTS AND 
AVERAGE SAILOR VALUES FOR 0% NAVY AND 100% SAILOR 
NMIs Offered PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Billet 5 $4,781 $2,085 $8,089 $14,955 5 $4,945 $1,823 $4,881 $3,089 $14,737
Billet 10 $4,781 $2,085 $8,089 $14,955 10 $4,945 $1,823 $4,881 $3,089 $14,737
Billet 15 $4,781 $2,085 $8,089 $14,955 15 $4,945 $1,823 $4,881 $3,089 $14,737
Billet 25 $4,857 $2,085 $8,089 $15,032 25 $4,804 $1,823 $5,000 $3,089 $14,715
Billet 35 $4,889 $2,035 $8,473 $15,397 35 $4,663 $1,880 $5,000 $2,986 $14,528
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Billet/Geo Stab 5 $4,727 $2,085 $8,089 $14,902 5 $4,663 $1,880 $4,762 $3,192 $14,495
Billet/Geo Stab 10 $4,353 $2,085 $7,458 $13,896 10 $4,380 $1,823 $4,762 $3,295 $14,259
Billet/Geo Stab 15 $4,020 $2,085 $7,075 $13,180 15 $3,956 $1,766 $4,762 $3,603 $14,087
Billet/Geo Stab 25 $3,851 $2,126 $8,020 $13,997 25 $3,902 $1,689 $4,627 $3,896 $14,113
Billet/Geo Stab 35 $3,582 $2,109 $7,644 $13,334 35 $3,567 $1,750 $4,965 $4,181 $14,463
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Geo Stab 5 $4,727 $2,085 $8,089 $14,902 5 $4,663 $1,880 $4,762 $3,192 $14,495
Geo Stab 10 $4,353 $2,085 $7,458 $13,896 10 $4,380 $1,823 $4,762 $3,295 $14,259
Geo Stab 15 $3,992 $2,085 $7,075 $13,152 15 $3,956 $1,766 $4,762 $3,603 $14,087
Geo Stab 25 $3,766 $2,135 $8,089 $13,990 25 $3,674 $1,766 $4,643 $3,809 $13,891
Geo Stab 35 $3,545 $2,067 $8,160 $13,773 35 $3,757 $1,748 $4,383 $4,107 $13,994
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP 0 $4,781 $2,085 $8,089 $14,955 0 $4,945 $1,823 $4,881 $3,089 $14,737
HP 5 $4,934 $2,031 $7,952 $14,918 5 $5,228 $1,766 $4,762 $2,883 $14,638
HP 10 $5,204 $2,031 $7,952 $15,188 10 $5,510 $1,766 $4,524 $2,677 $14,476
HP 15 $5,426 $2,085 $8,226 $15,737 15 $5,793 $1,709 $4,405 $2,471 $14,377
HP 25 $5,651 $2,085 $8,226 $15,962 25 $5,934 $1,709 $4,286 $2,368 $14,296
HP 35 $5,684 $2,081 $8,133 $15,899 35 $6,069 $1,748 $4,261 $2,211 $14,289
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP/Plat 5 $4,934 $2,031 $7,952 $14,918 5 $5,228 $1,766 $4,762 $2,883 $14,638
HP/Plat 10 $5,053 $2,135 $8,336 $15,524 10 $5,228 $1,936 $4,286 $2,780 $14,230
HP/Plat 15 $5,551 $2,129 $8,133 $15,813 15 $5,491 $1,981 $4,383 $2,422 $14,276
HP/Plat 25 $5,498 $2,128 $7,881 $15,508 25 $5,491 $2,155 $4,018 $2,317 $13,981
HP/Plat 35 $5,639 $2,154 $7,150 $14,944 35 $6,195 $2,234 $4,121 $2,138 $14,688
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
HP/Plat/Geo Stab 5 $4,934 $2,085 $7,705 $14,724 5 $5,228 $1,766 $4,762 $2,883 $14,638
HP/Plat/Geo Stab 10 $5,053 $2,135 $8,336 $15,524 10 $5,228 $1,936 $4,286 $2,780 $14,230
HP/Plat/Geo Stab 15 $5,813 $2,129 $7,348 $15,290 15 $5,491 $2,039 $4,383 $2,211 $14,124
HP/Plat/Geo Stab 25 $5,507 $2,066 $7,634 $15,207 25 $5,027 $2,205 $4,360 $2,370 $13,963
HP/Plat/Geo Stab 35 $5,833 $2,130 $7,298 $15,261 35 $5,995 $2,197 $4,745 $2,118 $15,054
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Plat 5 $4,532 $2,085 $8,089 $14,706 5 $4,663 $1,823 $4,881 $3,295 $14,661
Plat 10 $4,684 $2,135 $8,473 $15,292 10 $4,804 $1,880 $4,762 $3,192 $14,637
Plat 15 $4,608 $2,135 $8,226 $14,969 15 $4,804 $1,993 $4,643 $3,192 $14,632
Plat 25 $4,408 $2,135 $8,226 $14,769 25 $4,663 $2,050 $4,524 $3,295 $14,531
Plat 35 $5,162 $2,082 $7,816 $15,059 35 $4,945 $2,278 $4,167 $2,780 $14,170
PCS Training Fit Total HP  Platform Billet GeoStab Total
Plat/Geo Stab 5 $4,478 $2,085 $8,089 $14,652 5 $4,380 $1,880 $4,762 $3,398 $14,419
Plat/Geo Stab 10 $3,903 $2,135 $8,089 $14,128 10 $3,956 $1,993 $4,524 $3,603 $14,077
Plat/Geo Stab 15 $4,181 $2,126 $8,666 $14,972 15 $4,191 $1,981 $4,505 $3,580 $14,256
Plat/Geo Stab 25 $3,949 $2,126 $8,666 $14,740 25 $3,902 $1,981 $4,383 $3,791 $14,056
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